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Dewey’s Philosophy of Art and Aesthetic 
Experience

By Thomas Alexander 
Generally, philosophy tends to ignore art and aesthetic experience. Indeed, the subject we 
know as “aesthetics” was inaugurated by a German academic, Alexander Baumgarten, as 
recently as 1750. It is true that Plato described his highest form of forms, the most truly real, 
as the Form of the Beautiful (also the Form of the Good). “Beauty” was another word for the 
absolute perfection each Form not so much had as was. But the modern period, beginning in 
the 17th century—the period of Galileo, Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes—was 
committed to overthrowing the last traces of the classical and scholastic heritage for the idea 
of a science of nature based on bodies obeying mathematical laws of motion. The haunting 
question for these thinkers was: Is knowledge possible? After all, it was evident that since the 
Greeks we had been operating under a false cosmology, deemed true, and Aristotle, for all 
his knowledge, was clearly ignorant of the New World. The question of knowledge, 
summarized in the term “epistemology,” displaced all others and has continued to do so in 
most professional philosophy. Concerns like the experience of beauty or the possibility of 
establishing standards of artistic judgment were relegated to the “subjective” side of 
experience. One has but to look in today on various websites for departments of philosophy 
to see that most members of Anglophone departments are epistemologists—and those that 
are not, might as well be. Aesthetics itself has been turned into a subspeciality of 
epistemology. One reason the late Arthur Danto was so excited in 1964 on seeing Warhol’s 
Brillo Box was that it offered an ideal problem in epistemology: How is it that two objects, in 
all respect identical visually (i.e., a real Brillo box and Warhol’s exact rendition) are so 
ultimately different, one a carton for merchandise and the other a work of art? 
 It is thus a little more than astounding that John Dewey came to find a central place 
for aesthetics in his conception of philosophy and to criticize what he called “the 
epistemology industry.” This insight came gradually for him. He began his philosophical life 
as an adherent to one of the versions of absolute idealism that had flourished in Germany 
with G.W.F. Hegel in the early 19th century and in England later on. From the beginning, 
Dewey had wanted a philosophy that did justice to the richness of experience, and he 
thought he found this in absolute idealism, which argued that the piecemeal and 
fragmentary nature of our experience implied a fuller, indeed infinitely full, realization of 
truth, meaning, and beauty in that absolute totality of infinite mind. Our minute piece of 
experience contained evidence of the whole. This is expressed in his first book (1887), meant 
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to be a textbook in psychology—it was titled Psychology—but which was in fact a primer of 
idealist metaphysics. A couple of important events came quickly upon its heels. First, only 
three years after Dewey’s Psychology saw light, William James published his monumental 
The Principles of Psychology (1890), rendering Dewey’s book irrelevant; second, in 1894 
Dewey was appointed chair of the new University of Chicago’s Department of Philosophy 
where he had a chance not only to build a department, but integrate it with allied 
departments of pedagogy and psychology. Instead of studying Absolute Mind, Dewey was to 
study children learning. 
 Dewey always said that James’s Principles was the most influential book in his life. 
Not only did it incorporate genuine empirical material while being written in James’s 
unforgivably lively prose, but it presented to Dewey the thesis that experience did not come 
to us the way that philosophers like Locke or Hume—or Kant or Hegel—said, bits of mental 
units in need of an all-unifying rational mind. Experience came as a complex but integrated 
flow or, in James’s metaphor, “stream.” It was not thought’s job to organize it all but to 
select those aspects that had relevance for the life activity of the organism. Experience did 
not need some “absolute” to unify it; it came whole. James was also particularly sensitive to 
the way the field of experience exceeded what was at the forefront of consciousness and 
reason at any moment. The felt or qualitative “fringe” or “horizon” often had a much 
stronger say in what “made sense” or didn’t than philosophers liked to think. Dewey realized 
this; he realized he didn’t need the “absolute”—that experience had within it the material for 
developing its own inherent richness of meaning. 
 The other important event in Dewey’s early career, his appointment as chair of the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, was important not least for allowing 
Dewey to become familiar with the actual process of learning and child development. Like 
the impact of James’s Principles, the result from this was that the abstractions of idealist 
metaphysics were of no use in studying how people made sense of experience. Dewey 
eventually came up with his well-known “pattern of inquiry” model. We begin with an 
ambiguous, disturbed, or troubling situation and then undertake a process of analysis and 
trial to seek to render it unproblematic and settled. The outcome here had implications for 
the philosophical claim that human beings were always “knowing” experience as well as 
having it. Kant had tried to prove this by saying that we could always add “I think” to any 
proposition about experience. But what Dewey came to see was that experience was much 
wider than “knowing,” especially if by “knowing” we mean an actual process of inquiry, like 
looking for lost keys, and not some mental proposition. In other words, knowing or inquiry 
was a mediating phase of experience, not the whole picture. Dewey spelled out the extended 
argument for this in a series of essays published in 1903 along with contributions from the 
other members of his department, Studies in Logical Theory. 
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 Dewey left Chicago the following year for Columbia University as a result of a conflict 
over his wife’s involvement with the experimental “Dewey School.” The new situation seems 
to have allowed Dewey to undertake a very creative extension of some of his ideas and to 
drop any connection remaining with the school of absolute idealism. In a remarkable, indeed 
watershed, article published in 1905, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” Dewey there 
explicitly renounced the idea that all experience was also some sort of knowing—that, in 
other words, the problem of knowledge was the central problem of philosophy. The critical 
storm this essay raised indicated that Dewey had touched a very deep nerve, once so deep 
that many of today’s Dewey critics—and supporters—still can’t accept that this is what he 
meant. They like to focus on Dewey’s theory of inquiry, his “instrumentalism.” Some think 
this is a generic name for Dewey’s overall philosophy. It is not. The term he finally settled 
upon was “cultural naturalism.” 1  All this is important in order to realize how Dewey came to 
place such significance upon art and the aesthetic experience. What he was trying to say was 
that the field of experience was a lot wider than the most beloved topic of philosophy, the 
theory of knowledge, and that instead it was concerned instead with meaning. 
 By the time that Dewey came to write his magnum opus, Experience and Nature, in 
1925, he had come to a remarkable thesis: human beings crave meaning—not in the sense of 
polished abstractions but in the sense of lived, embodied, experienced meanings, meanings 
both  had or undergone and done or enacted. With this went Dewey’s sustained view that 
human beings were to be understood as living organisms fully involved with the world in the 
constant rhythmic balancing of organic functions. The terms “environmental” or “ecological” 
were not then widely used, but Dewey’s conception of human existence is thoroughly 
environmental or ecological in its basic description. Part of our environment, of course, is 
the world of society and culture. Culture gives us at birth an inherited world of symbolic 
meanings within which we gradually begin to take part. The process of meaning, too, is 
rhythmic, involving speaker and hearer, and, as a process, involves the possibility of 
development toward an integrative closure, a type of experience that Dewey came to call 
“consummatory.” In the next to last chapter of the book Dewey explicitly addressed the topic  
__________ 
1“I have come to think of my own position as cultural or humanistic Naturalism. Naturalism, properly interpreted, 
seems to me a more adequate term than Humanism. Of course I have always limited my use of ‘instrumentalism’ 
to my theory of thinking and knowledge; the word ‘pragmatism’ I have used very little, and then with 
reserves” (Dewey to Corliss Lamont, Sept. 6, 1940, cited in Corliss Lamont, “New Light on Dewey’s Common 
Faith,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 58, No. 1 [1961], p. 26.) 
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of art for the first time in his career. And he did so in rather superlative terms. Art, he says, is 
but another name for intelligent conduct of all sorts: 
“When this perception dawns, it will be a commonplace that art—the mode of 
activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed 
possession—is the complete culmination of nature, and that “science” is a 
handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue. Thus would 
disappear the separations that trouble present thinking: divisions of everything 
into nature and experience, practice and theory, art and science, useful and fine 
art, menial and free.” 2 
 These are amazing claims. Not only is art rather mystically said to be the 
complete culmination of nature, with science being but a “handmaiden” to it, but that 
in art are resolved the central dualisms that Dewey had spent his life battling (see LW 
1: 293). These claims were especially surprising for those who saw in Dewey little 
more than, as one of my colleagues put it, “a cheerleader for science.” Had Dewey 
taken a dramatic shift? 
 The short answer to that question is: No. Rather, I believe, he had found his voice. 
One can find passages from “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905) on that 
anticipate this, not least Dewey’s insistence that the greater part of human experience was a 
concern for meaning, not truth, not, that is, science. But these were startling words. For at 
least a decade, Dewey had cultivated one of the oddest friendships of his life with the 
irascible “self-made man” millionaire and art collector, Albert C. Barnes. Barnes had an 
amazingly good eye, especially for some of the newer artists: Matisse, Cezanne, Renoir, 
Seurat and others, and began to build the collection that is housed in the Barnes Foundation 
in Philadelphia. Barnes had become enthusiastic over Dewey’s philosophy and somehow 
opened a crack in his otherwise pugnacious nature for friendship to enter in. He began 
taking Dewey to Europe to visit not only the great museums but the ateliers of painters.3 In 
1931 Dewey was asked to give the William James Lectures at Harvard. These lectures would 
become Art as Experience (1934).4  This was a substantial book of over 350 pages, and it has 
proved as troubling to all those who want to see Dewey simply as an “instrumentalist,” 
taking “instrumentalism” here as “cheerleader for science.” But in that book Dewey says, “To 
__________ 
2 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, ed. Jo Ann Boydston as Volume 1 of The Later Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), p. 269. Hereafter cited as LW 1. The original edition appeared in 1925.                    
3 See George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), esp. p 
221 ff.                                                                                   
4 Volume 10 of The Later Works of John Dewey (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985). Hereafter cited as 
LW 10. I will also give the corresponding page reference to the original edition (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934), 
cited as AE. This also corresponds to the Capricorn paperback edition.  
artizein                  Volume II/Issue I                  SPECIAL EDITION                                      62
4
Artizein: Arts and Teaching Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/atj/vol2/iss1/9
 Arts & Teaching  November, 2016
esthetic experience then the philosopher must go to understand what experience is.” A 
philosophy is tested in its ability to grasp the nature of experience by its treatment of 
aesthetic experience (AE 274; LW 10:278). Experience was certainly the core idea of Dewey’s 
philosophy and it seems clear he meant this test to be applied to himself. 
 What, then, are some of the key ideas of Art as Experience? I will briefly discuss the 
following topics: (1) approaching art without the “museum attitude”; (2) the roots of art in 
“the live creature”; (3) consummatory experience; (4) the work of art vs the art product, and 
(5) The role of art in society. 
 When Dewey came to write Art as Experience, the reigning aesthetic theories could be 
described as formalism and expressionism. Formalism, finding its origins in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment (1790) wanted to say art aspired to pure form; it didn’t have any “purpose” like 
pleasing the crowds or edifying them. “Aesthetic” here means “without ulterior purpose.” Art 
was ultimately about only itself, a play of imagination. This idea was taken up by artists in 
the 19th century like Charles Baudelaire or Théophile Gautier who famously summed up the 
idea in the phrase “l’art pour l’art,” art for the sake of art. Art was supposed to lift one out of 
the sordid matters of daily existence and let one float in an aesthetic cloud of contemplation. 
In “Le cynge,” Mallarmé symbolized the artist by the image of a swan trapped in a frozen 
lake. Expressionism, by contrast, saw art as the outpouring of the inner vision of the genius, 
especially in terms of communicating with the crowd and thereby uplifting them. This was a 
view, by the way, that went well with ideas of the artist as a political reformer or as 
reconnecting a people with its mythic roots, as in the case of Wagner. Dewey’s aesthetics 
offers an alternative view, one broad enough to accommodate the insights of formalism and 
expressionism.  
1. Against the Museum Attitude 
Art as Experience begins with a strange warning: if one is going to theorize about art, the 
worst place to begin is by thinking of “art” as it is enshrined in art museums. At first this 
seems almost counter-intuitive: are not some of the world’s greatest visual arts precisely in 
museums—and thank God they are, for there we can see them! Dewey is not against 
museums. After all he was on the board of The Barnes Foundation and had visited the great 
museums of Europe. Dewey’s point here is about the danger of aesthetic theory beginning 
here. For one thing it inclines one to think of “art” as a collection of physical things. As we 
will see, for Dewey the real work of art is the way the art object (or “art product” in Dewey’s 
terminology) interacts with its audiences. The art lies in the “working of the work” more than 
simply being a “thing” as a physical thing.5  But there is a further problem. Many of the 
__________                  
5 The same point is made—rather more laboriously—by Martin Heidegger in his essay “The Origin of the Work of 
Art” (1935-37, published 1950 and revised 1960).                        
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objects filling museums were not originally intended for being seen there. They were artifacts 
in the life of a culture, not dead and lifeless but charged with meaning and a part of a 
community’s shared way of existence. A statue of a Greek god would have been revered in a 
temple just as a painting of the Virgin would have been venerated in a church. A red and 
black Greek kylix or wine bowl would have been filled with wine for a party filled with song 
and conversation. A Japanese raku-ware tea bowl would have been a part of the choda or tea 
ceremony, admired for its embodiment of “wabi” and “sabi,” words evoking an array of 
values among which are rustic simplicity and inward solitude.6 Dewey thinks these contexts 
are important in grasping the nature of art, at least art that was not intentionally created for 
being experienced in museums. “Art” arises in the way human beings express what gives 
meaning and value to their lives, even where the culture does not have either the idea or a 
word for “art.” To lose this root, as is likely when one begins with art objects abstracted from 
their living contexts in a museum and offered as candidates for “aesthetic” contemplation, is 
to lose the insight that art springs from the intensification of experienced meaning.  
If you think perhaps that Dewey was being overly cautious, look at André Malraux’s 
monumental Le Musée Imaginaire. Malraux was a formalist among formalists. Art was the 
creation of form, not just in individual works, but in the artist’s overall style. He celebrates 
books that bring all sorts of visual art objects together not just because they decontextualize 
the works even more than a museum but because they reproduce them in black and white—
abstracting color—and do so in images close to the same size; this reveals you see their true 
reality as form, as expressions of “style.” He would have loved the internet.  
2. The Live Creature 
Dewey turns instead toward what he calls “the live creature.” Dewey’s philosophy always 
came back to the idea that we are alive, organisms who are dynamically and rhythmically 
interacting with our environments. We, too, are not “things.” Our bodily involvement with 
the world pervades our unconscious experience and appears on the dim horizon of 
consciousness as a pervasive qualitative tonality or mood. Our relations to the world are not 
stable. At one moment we are thriving and at another suffering, be it something as mundane 
as hunger or as life-changing as the loss of a friend. When we are in balance, it is never mere 
balance, but a balance that could have been otherwise. Life is precarious, as Dewey liked to 
insist, and whenever order and stability have been achieved, values preserved, meaning 
attained, this experience is fraught with poignancy.7  This gives experience a vibrancy and 
__________ 
6 See the famous discussion by Okakura-Kakuzo, The Book of Tea (New York: Duffield and Co., 1906).              
7 Dewey had a close personal knowledge of this, having lost two of his children to disease. His older brother had been 
scalded to death in an accident. 
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tension. If the world offered complete stability or utter chaos, there would be no sense of 
realization or achievement. “These biological commonplaces are something more than that; 
they reach to the roots of the esthetic in experience” (AE 14; LW 10: 20). Art is born in this 
middle ground in the great rhythm of life. Indeed, the role of tension in the experience of the 
heightened vitality of meaning often leads artists to cultivate tensions and explore dangerous 
limits. Animals often exhibit this fully alert activity of being sensually in tune with the world: 
the dog seeing its owner return, the cat fixated on the twitching lure, the mockingbird 
singing full-throated from the top of its tree. 
There is a counterpart to this in human existence—a great deal of modern life is 
compartmentalized or disorganized so that the fundamental need for the experience of 
heightened vitality, of the aesthetic, is not realized. Our very senses cannot be themselves in 
the fullest way. “Only occasionally in the lives of many,” says Dewey, “are the senses fraught 
with the sentiment that comes from the deep realization of intrinsic meanings” (AE, 21; LW 
10: 27). Yet art itself is the proof that human beings can deliberately organize material in 
order to produce aesthetic experience. This leads us then to ask “What is aesthetic—or, in 
Dewey’s term, consummatory—experience? 
3. Consummatory Experience 
While much of human experience is fragmentary and unfulfilling there are instances 
whereof we can say “That was an experience!” An experience is a synonym for 
“consummatory experience,” the sort of experience that is inherently fulfilling. The energies 
driving the experience are not dissipated but establish an organization and reach closure. 
“Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-
sufficiency. It is an experience” (AE, 35; LW 10: 42). Such experiences need not be happy, 
harmonious or upbeat. Dewey mentions storms at sea, a rupture of friendship or a near 
accident. What they all have are intensified meaning that is felt as unifying the parts into a 
whole. 
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seem and without unfilled 
blanks, into what ensues. At the same time, there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the 
parts. A river, as distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and interest 
to its successive portions greater than exist in the homogeneous portions of a pond. In an 
experience, flow is from something to something. As one part leads into another and as 
one part carries what went on before, each gains distinctness in itself. The enduring 
whole is diversified by successive phases that are emphases of varied colors. (AE, 36; LW 
10: 43). 
These characteristics may be found in all sorts of experiences to which we might give other 
names—Dewey cites an experience of thinking or moral action. The key thing is the felt 
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underlying quality that emotionally pervades the whole and gives a sense of closure or 
resolution at the end. There are both doing and undergoing as in all experience, except here 
they are experienced in relation to each other. 
4. The Work of Art 
Dewey’s concept of an experience should help us understand why he didn’t want us to 
think of art objects as “things” that could be housed in museums. Dewey came to call the 
physical side of artworks—the canvass, stone, printed notes or words—the “art product,” 
reserving “art work” for the actual “working of the work.” He says, “the actual work of art is 
what the product does in with and in experience” (AE, 1; LW10: 1). There are not just many 
“Hamlets” but many Guernicas or Farewell to Arms. Of course some encounters may be 
superficial, but Dewey is willing to allow a plurality of “works,” traced back to the same art 
product, as revealing the on-going vitality of the work.  
Dewey finds a way to accommodate the ideas of expression and form through this process 
view of the art work. Expression is not to be thought of as something internal being “pressed 
out” of the artist—that the art product is like water coming from a tap. Expression is an 
interactive process in which the actual medium of the work—words, paint, stone—must come 
to embody and transmit a perceptual process of tensions, resistances, resolutions, structures. 
It is insofar as the artist is able to make the object an expressive ground that the audience 
may itself come to have an experience based on its encounters with the art product. Once the 
art object is made, either it becomes a basis for consummatory experiences or not and the 
artist becomes, as it were, a member of the audience.  
Form for Dewey is also linked with the idea of process. It is not some static underlying 
structure that we are supposed somehow to intuit, a ghostly Platonic essence shining 
through the film of matter. Form is rather how the art product organizes its energies to lead 
to an experience. It is how its various components work together toward the end of an 
experience. This sounds a bit like Frank Lloyd Wright’s famous saying “Form follows 
function.” If the function is conceived externally, then that is not the case. One may make a 
chair that fulfills the end of being a comfy chair that is nevertheless an eyesore. The end that 
an art work aims at is consummatory experience that is embodied in or directly expressive by 
the art object. A chair may be visually artistic—and quite uncomfortable. (Wright was 
notorious for making such things.) But if the chair makes its total form and its immediate 
utilitarian end consummatory, then form has followed function. Thus Dewey would be very 
sympathetic to the idea of aesthetic design in ordinary household objects. 
5. Art and Society 
To conclude, I want to say a few words about Dewey’s conception of art and democratic 
life. One of the main reasons Dewey thought art important was that it was able to show that 
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at least in some instances we were able to reorganize the world so as to embody the direct 
experience of meaning and value that by nature we seek. It thus provides a moral lesson to 
anyone who says that fatalistic acceptance of our generally alienated and unfulfilled 
existence is the only wisdom. Of course Dewey’s ultimate vision is for a community in which 
the richest potential for human existence was cultivated, one in which we took upon 
ourselves the ultimate work of art, our own lives. This is yet one more reason that beginning 
with the museum conception of art is problematic for aesthetic theory: we are disposed to 
see art as an escape from life, a “pause that refreshes,” instead of the implicitly revolutionary 
thing that it is, a call to restructure the way things are for the way things ought to be. As a 
mode of communication, Dewey saw art as achieving the most that we can hope for. 
Communication is not just transferring information. At its highest it is a way in which people 
partake of something together at an emotional and intuitive level. It becomes, in Dewey’s 
phrase, “shared experience.”  
In an address for a celebration of his 80th birthday in 1939, “Creative Democracy—The 
Task Before Us,” Dewey said that the essence of democracy was not to be found in political 
organization so much as in the respect for the potential of human life to create and 
experience those meanings and values that ultimately make life worthwhile. A society 
dedicated to that end—in which education of the young is central—would be illumined, to 
use a phrase of Wordsworth’s Dewey used often, “by the light that was never on land or sea.” 8 
________ 
8  For a more extended discussion of Dewey’s aesthetics, see my essay “The Art of Life: Dewey’s Aesthetics” in 
Reading Dewey, ed. Larry Hickman (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1998) and the discussion in Steven 
Fesmire, Dewey (New York: Routledge, 2015), Chapter 6.  
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